When Courts and Congress Don’t Say What They Mean: Initial Reactions to Morrison v. National Australia Bank and to the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act by Painter, Richard et al.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Journal of International Law
2011
When Courts and Congress Don’t Say What They
Mean: Initial Reactions to Morrison v. National
Australia Bank and to the Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act
Richard Painter
Douglas Dunham
Ellen Quackenbos
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjil
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota
Journal of International Law collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Painter, Richard; Dunham, Douglas; and Quackenbos, Ellen, "When Courts and Congress Don’t Say What They Mean: Initial
Reactions to Morrison v. National Australia Bank and to the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act" (2011).
Minnesota Journal of International Law. 255.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjil/255
PAINTER Formatted - CDL 11/29/2010 9:27 AM 
 
1 
Article 
When Courts and Congress Don’t Say 
What They Mean: Initial Reactions to 
Morrison v. National Australia Bank and 
to the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act 
Richard Painter,∗ Douglas Dunham,∗∗ and Ellen 
Quackenbos*** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
People don’t always say exactly what they mean.  Judges 
and legislators are no exception. Judicial opinions sometimes 
painstakingly interpret the language of a statute or articulate 
some other legal rule and then summarize their holding in a 
sentence or two, often preceded by language such as “We 
therefore hold that . . . .” What follows this phrase may not 
coincide precisely with what is said in the rest of the opinion, 
even if the summary encompasses the particular facts of the 
case. In subsequent cases with other facts, the difference 
between those facts and the court’s summarizing language can 
lead to litigation over what exactly the court meant. 
Such is likely to happen with respect to Morrison v. 
National Australia Bank,1 the Supreme Court’s most recent 
opinions directed at extraterritorial enforcement of securities 
laws. Throughout this opinion, Justice Scalia, writing for the 
majority, defined the reach of the federal securities laws based 
 
∗  Richard Painter, a law professor at the University of Minnesota, was the principal author 
of an amicus brief filed by 21 law professors in Morrison v. National Australian Bank. 
∗∗ Douglas Dunham, a lawyer at Skadden Arps, was one of the authors and counsel of 
record for that amicus brief.   
*** Ellen Quackenbos, also a lawyer at Skadden Arps, was one of the authors of the amicus 
brief.   
 1. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
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on a single inquiry: whether the United States was the place of 
the securities transaction.  In summarizing the holding, Justice 
Scalia wrote that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(Exchange Act) Section 10(b) applies only to “transactions in 
securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic 
transactions in other securities.”2   
The problem with this summary is that the National 
Australia Bank (NAB) securities at issue in the case were in 
fact listed in the United States, which was required so NAB 
could have American Depository Receipts (ADRs) trade in New 
York.  For the many issuers that list the same securities both 
in the United States and in another country, the confusion 
created by Justice Scalia’s summary of the holding could be 
problematic. The Supreme Court almost certainly did not 
intend to grant a right to sue in the United States when such 
securities are bought outside the United States. Federal district 
and appeals courts, however, will likely have to adjudicate the 
claims of plaintiffs raising this very argument.  
The Supreme Court is not alone in creating this confusion; 
Congress has had its own drafting problems.  In the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-
Frank Act),3 Congress wanted to respond to Morrison by giving 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) power to pursue the type of fraud 
alleged in Morrison—fraudulent conduct inside the United 
States that affects securities transactions outside the United 
States. The result would, in effect, reverse Morrison and make 
United States securities laws apply.4 Congress drafted the 
 
 2. Id. at 2884; see also id. at 2886, 2888 (reiterating the reach of Section 
10b). 
 3. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 929P(b) (2010) 
 4. Congress titled the section the “Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the 
Antifraud Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws” and amended three 
securities acts to add the following new subsection: 
(c) EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.—The jurisdiction of the district courts of 
the United States and the United States courts of any Territory described 
under subsection (a) includes violations of section 17(a), and all suits in equity 
and actions at law under that section, involving—(1) conduct within the 
United States that constitutes significant steps in furtherance of the violation, 
even if the securities transaction occurs outside the United States and 
involves only foreign investors; or (2) conduct occurring outside the United 
States that has a foreseeable substantial effect within the United States. 
Id. § 929P(b) (amending The Securities Act of 1933.—Section 22 of the 
Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77v(a)), The Securities Exchange Act of 
1934.— Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78aa), 
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Dodd-Frank Act provisions based on the assumption that the 
question they were addressing was whether disputes involving 
the application of securities laws transactions outside the 
United States could be considered questions of subject matter 
jurisdiction. For forty years before Morrison, various circuit 
courts had analyzed the issue in just such a manner.5 The 
Dodd-Frank Act provisions responded to Morrison by expressly 
giving federal courts jurisdiction in certain circumstances over 
SEC and DOJ suits concerning securities transactions outside 
the United States.6   
The problem with the Dodd-Frank Act provisions is that 
the Supreme Court in Morrison had already decided that under 
existing law federal courts had jurisdiction over these cases.7 
Rather, the Supreme Court held that securities transactions 
outside the United States were not covered by the language of 
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, a question of the merits. 
Indeed, several months before, in late 2009, the Supreme Court 
in Union Pacific Railroad v. Locomotive Engineers & Trainmen 
General Committee of Adjustment, Central Region clarified its 
position that anything that does not go to the power of the 
courts to hear a case is a question of the merits and not of 
jurisdiction.8 As long ago as 1959, in Romero v. International 
Terminal Operating Co., the Supreme Court had approached 
extraterritoriality as a merits question.9  Furthermore, in 
October 2009, the Solicitor General and the SEC, in their brief 
opposing the certiorari petition in Morrison, recognized that the 
extraterritorial question was not jurisdictional.10 Combined, 
 
and The Investment Advisers Act of 1940.—Section 214 of the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b–14)). 
 5. See, e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208 (2d Cir.), 
modified on other grounds en banc, 405 F.2d 215, 217 (2d Cir. 1968); In re CP 
Ships Ltd. Sec. Litig., 578 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2009); Cont’l Grain 
(Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 421 (8th Cir. 1979). 
 6. See Dodd-Frank Act, § 929P(b) (2010). 
 7. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877. 
 8. See Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and 
Trainmen General Committee of Adjustment, Central Region, 130 S. Ct. 584, 
598–99 (2009). 
 9. See Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 359, 381–84 
(1959), cited in Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877. 
 10. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, Morrison v. 
National Australia Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (No. 08-1191) (“If a particular 
suit is otherwise an appropriate means of enforcing a ‘liability or duty created 
by’ the Exchange Act or rules promulgated thereunder by the Commission, 
Section 78aa unambiguously vests the district courts with jurisdiction to 
resolve it.”). See id. (“Thus, under the plain terms of Section 78aa, the 
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these developments make it all the more puzzling that 
Congress still approached extraterritoriality as a question of 
jurisdiction when drafting the Dodd-Frank Act. 
While the Congress’s intent in passing the Dodd-Frank Act 
seems directed at empowering the SEC and DOJ to combat 
securities fraud, one can credibly argue that they failed to do 
so.11 The Dodd-Frank Act provisions merely restated what 
Morrison had already clearly stated: specifically, that federal 
courts had jurisdiction in these types of cases. Because the 
Dodd-Frank Act only approached the question of jurisdiction, 
and did not address the substantive reach of Section 10(b) of 
the Exchange Act, Congress arguably left the SEC and DOJ 
with no more power than they had the day Morrison was 
decided. 
Many lower court judges are not eager to frustrate the 
intent of Congress, and Congress obviously intended the Dodd-
Frank Act to empower the SEC and DOJ to pursue 
transnational securities fraud.  Other judges might say, 
however, that the intent of Congress is in the language of the 
statute, and nothing more.12  If the statute is worded so as to be 
meaningless, so be it.  The Supreme Court also has rarely been 
shy of highlighting when Congress fails to draft a statute that 
reflects its true intentions.13  It is possible that before a case 
reaches the Supreme Court, Congress will change the 
 
geography of an alleged fraudulent scheme—i.e., whether it was conceived and 
executed in whole or in part outside the United States—is irrelevant to the 
district court's subject-matter jurisdiction.”).  
 11. Indeed, the day the President signed the Dodd-Frank Act, George 
Conway, the lawyer who argued and won the Morrison case for NAB, 
published a memo to his firm’s clients stating that Congress’s Dodd-Frank Act 
provisions may have done nothing meaningful at all. See George T. Conway 
III, Extraterritoriality of the Federal Securities Laws After Dodd-Frank:  Partly 
Because of a Drafting Error, the Status Quo Should Remain Unchanged, 
WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSE & KATZ (June 21, 2010), 
http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/WLRKMemos/WLRK/WLRK.17763
.10.pdf. 
 12. See, e.g., Mwasaru v. Napolitano, 2010 WL 3419458, at *4 (6th Cir. 
Sept. 1, 2010) (“[L]egislative intent should be divined first and foremost from 
the plain language of the statute.  If the text of the statute may be read 
unambiguously and reasonably, our inquiry is at an end.”) (citation omitted). 
 13. See, e.g., Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 157–58 (1991) (rejecting 
what Congress may have intended and explaining “[t]he fact that Congress 
may not have foreseen all of the consequences of a statutory enactment is not 
a sufficient reason for refusing to give effect to its plain meaning”) (citation 
omitted); Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 164 (1991) (noting that "it makes no 
difference whether the legislative history affirmatively reflects" a certain 
intent, if "the plain language of the statute" is to the contrary). 
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legislative language and directly address the substantive reach 
of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.  If not, sooner or later, 
there will be a litigant who chooses to challenge a SEC or DOJ 
suit and run the risk of losing on the basis that Congress did 
not empower the SEC or DOJ to bring the suit. The litigant 
would argue that Congress may have meant to create a cause of 
action for the SEC and DOJ, but did not do so. 
The first part of this article will address whether there are 
any logical exceptions that can be found to the Supreme Court’s 
limitation of the federal securities laws to transactions taking 
place within the United States. This article concludes that the 
answer to this question is no. The second part of this article 
will address whether the confusion arising out of Congress’ 
language choices in the Dodd-Frank Act is such as to merit 
amendment to the statute. This article concludes that, while 
the statutory language probably gives the SEC the authority 
that Congress intended, the statute should still be amended. 
II. MORRISON V. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK 
In late June 2010, the Supreme Court ruled in Morrison v. 
National Australia Bank that securities fraud suits could not 
be brought under U.S. law against foreign defendants by 
foreign plaintiffs who bought their securities outside the United 
States (“f-cubed” securities litigation).14 In Morrison, Australian 
plaintiffs attempted to pursue claims under U.S. federal 
securities law after purchasing shares of an Australian bank on 
the Australia stock exchange and claiming they had been 
misled in Australia by statements by Australian bank officials 
regarding the performance of a U.S. subsidiary.15 The Supreme 
Court rejected alleged fraudulent concealment of bad mortgage 
loans in a U.S. subsidiary as sufficient justification to apply 
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act extraterritorially to 
transactions on the Australian stock exchange.16   
In its opinion, the Supreme Court held that Section 10(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does not apply 
extraterritorially,17 and that “the focus of the Exchange Act is 
not upon the place where the deception originated, but upon 
 
 14. See Morrison 130 S. Ct. at 2888. 
 15. See id. at 2875–76. 
 16. See id. at 2883–84. 
 17. See id. at 2883. 
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purchases and sales of securities in the United States.”18  Thus, 
the Supreme Court rejected the proposal of the Solicitor 
General and the SEC to apply the Exchange Act to fraud in 
extraterritorial securities transactions that “[involve] 
significant conduct in the United States that is material to the 
fraud’s success.”19 The Supreme Court concluded that Section 
10(b) reaches only fraud in connection with the “purchase or 
sale of a security listed on an American stock exchange, and the 
purchase or sale of any other security in the United States.”20   
In February 2010, twenty-one law professors from around 
the country filed an amicus brief with the Supreme Court in 
Morrison.21 The brief urged the Supreme Court to establish a 
bright line rule limiting the application of the federal securities 
fraud statute to securities bought or sold in the United States.22 
The law professors’ position was that the place of the 
transaction is the determining factor for deciding whether 
Section 10(b) applies.23  
The fundamental premise of both the amicus brief and the 
Supreme Court’s holding is that U.S. securities laws were 
intended to protect U.S. markets.24 Congress has enacted 
specific provisions that allow the SEC to pursue conduct in 
foreign markets in particular situations that affect the 
securities of U. S. issuers or where conduct abroad is intended 
to evade the purposes of U.S. securities laws.25 Otherwise, U.S. 
securities laws do not apply to securities traded abroad.26   
III. DUAL LISTED SECURITIES AFTER THE 
MORRISON OPINION 
Despite the bright line test adopted in Morrison, some open 
 
 18. Id. at 2884.   
 19. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2886–88 (2010). 
 20. Id. at 2888. 
 21. Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Respondents, 
Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (No. 08-1191), 
2010 WL 740747 [hereinafter Law Professors Amicus Br.]. 
 22. See id. at 2. (arguing that such a bright line rule aligns with the 
legislative history and congress’s original intent to cover only those foreign 
securities traded within the United States). 
 23. See id. at 6, 31. 
 24. See id. at 14–18; Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877–85 (2010). 
 25. See Law Professors Amicus Br., supra note 21 at 19–20 (describing the 
purpose of Section 30 of the Exchange Act). 
 26. See id. 
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issues remain. In the vast majority of instances, the “location of 
transaction” test is a clear test; some issues linger, however, 
because the test remains ambiguous in a small but significant 
number of transactions. Transactions on a securities exchange 
are usually easy to place in a particular location—the location 
of the exchange. It is irrelevant whether the investor resides in 
the United States or abroad.27 In addition, the vast majority of 
over-the-counter transactions also occur in one country or 
another. However, situations occur where the location of the 
transaction is ambiguous. This happens particularly in two 
instances. The first instance is where the transaction is in one 
country and a broker-dealer or other intermediary is in 
another. The second is in private transactions—particularly in 
derivative securities and similar instruments—implemented 
through steps taken both inside and outside the United States. 
In these two instances the application of Morrison may be 
unclear.28 This article does not address these situations, but it 
is predictable that there will be a significant amount of post-
Morrison litigation over which transactions take place inside 
the United States and which do not. Rather, this article 
addresses the impact of the Morrison decision on a small subset 
of securities transactions taking place outside the United 
States—transactions in securities that are also listed on a 
United States securities exchange.   
 
 27. This issue has already come up in at least two cases involving “f-
squared securities litigation” (investors inside the United States who purchase 
securities outside the United States and then sue foreign defendants outside 
the United States). In Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., No. 08 Civ. 3758 (VM), 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76543 (S.D.N.Y July 27, 2010), plaintiffs argued that 
because they resided in the United States their transactions on foreign 
markets should be deemed to take place inside the United States. Judge 
Marrero rejected this claim and granted summary judgment to the 
defendants:  “In Morrison the Supreme Court roundly (and derisively) buried 
the venerable ‘conduct or effect’ test . . . . Yet here, Lead Plaintiffs seek to 
exhume and revive the body.” Id. at *6. In another case, plaintiffs representing 
U.S. investors who purchased shares in Toyota outside the United States 
claimed that the Court’s holding in Morrison allows their claims to be brought 
under Section 10(b) because the investors’ location determines the location of 
their transactions. The district court, however, rejected this argument at least 
for purposes of designating a lead plaintiff in the litigation, and it appears 
likely that courts will continue to reject the argument. See Stackhouse v. 
Toyota Motor Co., No. CV 10-0922 DSF (AJWx), slip op. (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 28. See In re Banco Santander Sec.—Optimal Litig., No. 1:09-cv-20215-
PCH, slip op. at 1 (S.D. Fla. July 30, 2010) (dismissing complaint of foreign 
purchasers in foreign fund that invested in Bernie Madoff’s funds who argued 
that they should be able to sue Banco Santander S.A. and other foreign 
companies in the United States). 
PAINTER Formatted - CDL 11/29/2010  9:27 AM 
8 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW [Vol 20:1 
 
A. APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 10(b)(5) AFTER MORRISON 
The most problematic phrases in the entire Morrison 
opinion appear in two places. First, there is a summary of the 
holding which states: “And it is in our view only transactions in 
securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic 
transactions in other securities, to which §10(b) applies.”29 
Second, at the end of the opinion, there is similar language: 
“Section 10(b) reaches the use of a manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance only in connection with the purchase or 
sale of a security listed on an American stock exchange, and the 
purchase or sale of any other security in the United States.” 30 
Looking at these two sentences alone, the unanswered question 
is whether, for a security listed on a domestic exchange, the 
transaction in that security also has to take place on that 
domestic exchange or elsewhere in the United States. As 
explained more fully below, the answer to this question is 
almost certainly “yes” in view of what is said in the rest of the 
opinion, but these two sentences—if read in isolation—appear 
to leave that question ambiguous.31 
Plaintiffs’ lawyers are already using these sentences to 
 
 29. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884.   
 30.  Id. at 2888. Justice Scalia probably used the summarizing language 
he did because the language in the Exchange Act reads: “the purchase or sale 
of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not 
so registered.” 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006). This sentence—which in essence means 
“any security”—was meant to ensure that the Securities Exchange Act, which 
was designed primarily to regulate U.S. exchanges, would not be avoided by 
people who trade securities off the exchanges. There is no distinction made in 
this part of the Exchange Act, however, between securities registered on 
national securities exchanges and those not so registered; indeed the express 
language states that they shall be treated the same. Id. The Morrison holding 
is that this Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act only applies to transactions in 
the United States. In other words, Section 10(b) applies to the purchase or sale 
of a security registered on a national securities exchange or any other security 
in the United States.  
 31. The Court in Morrison refers to “securities not registered on domestic 
exchanges” and goes on to say that with respect to such securities the foreign 
location of the transaction precludes the Exchange Act’s applicability absent 
regulations from the SEC in the narrow circumstances permitted under 
Section 30 of the Exchange Act. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2885. Securities that 
are registered on domestic exchanges are discussed as follows: “And it is in our 
view only transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges, and 
domestic transactions in other securities, to which § 10(b) applies.” Id. at 2884. 
The very same paragraph, however, begins with the following sentence:  
“Applying the same mode of analysis here, we think that the focus of the 
Exchange Act is not upon the place where the deception originated, but upon 
purchases and sales of securities in the United States.” Id. 
PAINTER Formatted - CDL 11/29/2010  9:27 AM 
2011] MORRISON V. NATIONAL AUSTRALIAN BANK 9 
 
argue that even if the overwhelming majority of an issuer’s 
shares are traded outside the United States, as long as the 
issuer’s shares are listed on a domestic U.S. exchange, 
transactions of all of the issuer’s shares are covered by Section 
10(b)(5).32 It does not matter that the transactions take place on 
a foreign exchange.  
Many Canadian companies, for example, have one class of 
common shares that trades on both the Toronto exchange and 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). In other words, you 
could buy the shares on the NYSE and then sell the very same 
shares in Toronto, and vice versa. So with respect to such 
companies, applying the language of Morrison literally, Section 
10(b) would apply to a purchase of securities in Canada on the 
Toronto exchange by a Canadian citizen, simply because the 
shares are also listed on the NYSE. This interpretation is 
inconsistent with what is said in the rest of the opinion, but it 
appears to be literally what is said in the Morrison opinion.33 
The opinion adds confusion when it tries to distinguish the 
facts of Morrison from Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook.34 
Schoenbaum involved Section 10(b) claims by an American 
shareholder of a Canadian company (Banff) based upon sales in 
Canada by the company of its treasury shares to affiliated 
corporations at a price that the corporations allegedly knew 
was less than the true value of the shares.35 Banff’s common 
stock was registered with the SEC and traded on both the 
American Stock Exchange and the Toronto Stock Exchange.36 
According to the Supreme Court in Morrison, the treasury 
shares at issue in Schoenbaum were not listed on the American 
Stock Exchange.37 However, as the Second Circuit’s opinion in 
Schoenbaum made clear, the Banff treasury shares were shares 
of the company’s common stock.38 Indeed, the fact that the 
challenged transactions in Schoenbaum “involve[d] stock 
registered and listed on a national securities exchange,” and 
thus directly affected the interests of American investors,39 was 
 
 32. See Pls.’ Supp. Mem. Concerning the Impact of Morrison v. NAB at 
10–16, in In Re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 5571 (S.D.N.Y. 
July 16, 2010). 
 33.  See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884, 2888. 
 34.  Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 200. 
 35. Id. at 204. 
 36. Id.   
 37. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878.   
 38. Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 205. 
 39. Id. at 208; see also id. at 206 (holding that Congress intended the 
PAINTER Formatted - CDL 11/29/2010  9:27 AM 
10 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW [Vol 20:1 
 
key to the Second Circuit’s determination that Section 10(b) 
applied.   
The Morrison opinion disapproves of Schoenbaum, its 
analysis, and the result reached therein.40 The Supreme Court’s 
express (if incorrect) statement that the transactions in 
Morrison did not involve stock listed on an American 
exchange,41 however, combined with its statement that Rule 
10b-5 applies to “transactions in securities listed on domestic 
exchanges,” may be argued to leave some ambiguity as to the 
applicability of Section 10(b) to transactions that take place 
abroad in stock of a class also listed on an American exchange.42   
Nevertheless, a reading of the entire Morrison opinion 
supports the view that the Supreme Court did not mean to 
extend the reach of Section 10(b) to foreign transactions in 
securities “listed on an American exchange.” The Supreme 
Court’s unequivocal holding is that Section 10(b) does not apply 
“extraterritorially.”43 It would drive an extremely large hole 
into that holding if the mere listing of a stock on an American 
exchange were enough to alter the extraterritoriality of a 
foreign purchase of the stock on a foreign exchange, as there 
are well over 400 foreign issuers that list their shares on both a 
foreign exchange and a U.S. exchange.44   
Moreover, the Supreme Court repeatedly emphasizes the 
“focus” of American securities laws on “domestic transactions” 
and on “purchases and sales of securities in the United 
States.”45 Thus, the court’s emphasis on “transactions in 
securities listed on domestic exchanges” is intended to define 
what conduct must be evaluated to assess “where a putative 
 
Exchange Act to be extraterritorial in order to protect American investors 
“who have purchased foreign securities on American exchanges.”). 
 40. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878–81. 
 41. See id. at 2888 ("This case involves no securities listed on a domestic 
exchange . . . .").  
 42. See id. at 2874; see also id. at 2881 (explaining that 17 C.F.R. § 
240.10b-5 is “promulgated under § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act”); 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010) (prohibiting fraudulent use of national securities 
exchanges). 
 43. Id. at 2883 ("In short, there is no affirmative indication in the 
Exchange Act that § 10(b) applies extraterritorially, and we therefore conclude 
that it does not."). 
 44. See U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, FOREIGN 
COMPANIES REGISTERED AND REPORTING WITH THE U.S. SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION (2009). 
 45. See Morrison, 130 U.S. at 2874. 
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violation occurs.”46 That is, the location of the transaction (and 
not the location of allegedly fraudulent conduct) determines 
whether the application of Section 10(b) would be 
extraterritorial and thus impermissible, or domestic and thus 
within the intended scope of the statute. The Supreme Court’s 
language is not intended, however, to extend the application of 
Section 10(b) to transactions on foreign exchanges.   
Furthermore, the Supreme Court was well aware that 
NAB had ADRs listed in New York and that Section 10(b) does 
apparently apply to ADRs (which were not an issue in the 
case).47 In order for a foreign issuer to sponsor and list ADRs on 
a U.S. exchange, it must register the underlying, deposited 
shares with the SEC and, at least for the NYSE, actually list 
the underlying shares (though not for trading).48 NAB’s 
registration statements in the United States, for example, 
pertained to the “ordinary shares.”49 The Supreme Court 
nonetheless held that Section 10(b) did not apply to NAB’s 
ordinary shares traded in Australia.50 This holding is 
inconsistent with a theory that the Court would apply Section 
10(b) to any security listed on a U.S. exchange even if the 
transaction in that security is outside the United States.   
Many companies have ADRs trading in the United States. 
It cannot possibly be the case that the Supreme Court intended 
Section 10(b) to apply not only to the ADR itself but also to a 
foreign purchase of the underlying stock on a foreign exchange 
simply because the underlying shares are registered in the 
United States to enable the company to issue the ADR. 
Otherwise, Section 10(b) after Morrison would have a broader 
 
 46.  See id. at 2884, n.9.  
 47.   See id. at 2875, 2876 n.1 (explaining that NAB had ADR’s trading in 
NewYork, but the ADR holders’ claims were dismissed in district court. NAB 
had not disputed that investors who purchased its ADRs in the United States 
would be covered by U.S. securities laws.). 
 48. See 15 U.S.C. § 78l (2006).   
 49. Page 58 of the Supplemental Joint Appendix in Morrison v. NAB, the 
20-F cover says that NAB’s ordinary shares were “registered” on the “NYSE.” 
Supp. Joint App. at 58 Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 
(2010). This cover looks exactly like the 20-F cover for Vivendi that the 
plaintiffs there are relying on. The registration regulation is cited in the 
Vivendi plaintiffs’ brief.  See Plaintiffs' Supp. Mem. Concerning the Impact of 
Morrison v. NAB at 11, in In re Vivendi Universal , S.A., Sec. Litig., No. 02 
Civ. 5571 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2010) (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.12d1-1). 
 50. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876–77 (affirming the District Court’s 
ruling); see also In Re Nat’l Austl. Bank Sec. Litig., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
94162, at 15-16. (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2006). 
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extraterritorial reach than ever before, the exact opposite of 
what the Supreme Court clearly intended. Such a reading of 
Morrison is illogical and is also contrary to the result in the 
case. It also makes little sense to argue that the result would be 
different, and Section 10(b) would apply to transactions in 
NAB’s ordinary shares outside the United States, if NAB had 
listed its ordinary shares for trading on the NYSE instead of 
listing the ADRs. There is little substantive difference between 
these two types of arrangements.51   
B. SECTION 30 OF THE EXCHANGE ACT 
Congress specifically addressed the extraterritorial reach 
of the Exchange act in Section 30.52 The Morrison opinion 
observed that Congress specifically addressed in Section 30 
those situations where the SEC needs to protect investors in 
the United States against violations of the Exchange Act in 
foreign trading markets. The Morrison opinion also makes it 
clear that Congress did not intend the extraterritorial effect of 
the Exchange Act to go beyond the specific provisions of Section 
30, which is Congress’s only articulation of the extraterritorial 
reach of Section 10(b). The Supreme Court explained that 
Section 30(b) “seems to us to be directed at actions abroad that 
might conceal a domestic violation, or might cause what would 
 
 51. As the Supreme Court explained in Morrison, an NAB ADR 
"represent[s] the right to receive a specified number of [NAB's] ordinary 
shares," and thus is functionally equivalent to a purchase of the stock itself. 
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2875. 
 52. Section 30 provides: 
 
(a) It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer, directly or indirectly, to make 
use of the mails or of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce for 
the purpose of effecting on an exchange not within or subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States, any transaction in any security the issuer of 
which is a resident of, or is organized under the laws of, or has its principal 
place of business in, a place within or subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may 
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the 
protection of investors or to prevent the evasion of this title. 
 
(b) The provisions of this title or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall not 
apply to any person insofar as he transacts a business in securities without 
the jurisdiction of the United States, unless he transacts such business in 
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe 
as necessary or appropriate to prevent the evasion of this title.   
15 U.S.C. § 78dd(a)-(b) (2010). 
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otherwise be a domestic violation to escape on a technicality.”53 
The only situation where Section 30(b) contemplates the 
applicability of the Exchange Act to transactions outside the 
United States is when a transaction contravenes rules or 
regulations prescribed by the SEC to prevent evasion of the 
Act.54 However, the SEC has not identified specific situations in 
which transactions in securities outside the United States are 
deemed as evasion of the Exchange Act simply because the 
same securities are also listed in the United States. As a result, 
the SEC has not promulgated any rules to address such a 
problem. Therefore, the mere fact that a security is listed in the 
United States, as well as abroad, does not automatically make 
transactions in that security outside the United States as 
evasion of the Exchange Act.   
Likewise, Section 30(a) reinforced the Supreme Court’s 
extraterritoriality analysis that “[i]ts explicit provision for a 
specific extraterritorial application would be quite superfluous 
if the rest of the Exchange Act already applied to transactions 
on foreign exchanges—and its limitation of that application to 
securities of domestic issuers would be inoperative.”55 The non-
U.S. issuer is beyond the scope of Section 30(a) insofar as the 
transaction occurs in a foreign market.56 It does not matter that 
the issuer—like NAB—has securities listed in the United 
States. Congress could have extended the coverage of Section 
30(a) to all securities with dual listings by including in Section 
30(a) the clause “non-U.S. issuers that have securities listed in 
the United States” in the statute. If Congress had done so, 
Section 30(a) would have applied to brokers or dealers in 
connection with such securities wherever the securities are 
traded. Congress, however, did not do so and explicitly limited 
Section 30(a) to transactions of securities by U.S. issuers.   
As suggested in the law professors’ amicus brief, the 
Supreme Court should avoid confusion over this issue by 
holding that Section 10(b) applies only to securities bought or 
sold in the United States.57 This is likely the Supreme Court’s 
 
 53. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2882–83.   
 54.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (2006). 
 55. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883.   
 56. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(a) (2006) (applying only to transaction in 
securities that "the issuer of which is a resident of, or is organized under the 
laws of, or has its principal place of business in, a place within or subject to 
the jurisdiction of the United States...."). 
 57. Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Respondents at 31. 
The brief urges the Court to uphold the original intent of the Congress until 
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intent in Morrison when the Court referred to “transactions in 
securities listed on domestic exchanges.”58 The phrase likely 
included all transactions on those exchanges, not merely the 
listing of the securities on those exchanges. The entirety of the 
opinion—in particular the emphasis on the location of the 
securities transaction throughout the opinion—supports this 
interpretation.59 Furthermore, the two strongest policy 
arguments supporting the Morrison opinion—applying Section 
10(b) to foreign exchanges would (i) interfere with the laws of 
other countries and (ii) turn the U.S. into a Shangri-La for 
plaintiffs’ lawyers suing on behalf of investors who purchased 
their shares on foreign exchanges—would be undermined by 
allowing worldwide class actions under U.S. securities laws 
against dual listed companies. In sum, it is clear that plaintiffs 
who made transactions of securities outside the United States 
do not have a cause of action under Section 10(b) just because 
these securities are listed on a U.S. securities exchange.  
IV. THE DODD-FRANK ACT 
Congress quickly responded to Morrison—language on 
extraterritoriality in the Dodd-Frank Act is based on proposals 
made before the Morrison case was even decided.60 Many 
 
the legislature takes further action. 
 58. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884 (“And it is in our view only transactions 
in securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other 
securities, to which § 10(b) applies.”). 
 59. Id. at 2882 ("Nothing suggests that this national public interest 
[described in 15 U.S.C. § 78b] pertains to transactions conducted upon foreign 
exchanges and markets.") (emphasis in original); id. at 2883 (explaining that § 
30(a)'s "explicit provision for a specific extraterritorial application would be 
quite superfluous if the rest of the Exchange Act already applied to 
transactions on foreign exchanges—and its limitation of that application to 
securities of domestic issuers would be inoperative."); id. at 2884 ("[T]he focus 
of the Exchange Act is not upon the place where the deception originated, but 
upon purchases and sales of securities in the United States."); id. ("The 
primacy of the domestic exchange is suggested by the very prologue of the 
Exchange Act . . . "); id. at 2885 (Stating that under § 30(a) & (b), "it is the 
foreign location of the transaction that establishes (or reflects the presumption 
of) the Act's inapplicability, absent regulations by the Commission."); 
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2885 (noting the "same focus on domestic transactions" 
in the Securities Act of 1933); id. ("Like the United States, foreign countries 
regulate their domestic securities exchanges and securities transaction 
occurring within their territorial jurisdiction.").  
 60. See H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2010). The House version of the bill, 
however, was enacted after the United States submitted its brief of October 
2009 opposing the cert petition in Morrison. This brief expressly acknowledged 
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observers predicted that the Court in Morrison would bar f-
cubed securities cases and that the SEC wanted Congress to be 
prepared.61 Some members of Congress wanted to expand the 
private right of action to cover such cases, and others are 
content to simply give enforcement powers to the SEC.62 
Section 7216 of the Dodd-Frank Act was originally drafted 
to provide extraterritorial jurisdiction with respect to antifraud 
provisions in the federal securities laws if there is ‘conduct 
within the United States that constitutes significant steps in 
furtherance of the violation, even if the securities transaction 
occurs outside the United States and involves only foreign 
investors.’63 The proposed language covered Section 22 of the 
Securities Act of 1933,64 Section 27 of the Exchange Act65 and 
Section 214 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.66 
The SEC favored a similar provision, but one limited to 
extending jurisdiction of U.S. courts to cases brought by the 
SEC. The language that was ultimately written into the Dodd-
Frank Act was apparently drafted by the SEC and was 
substantially similar to the earlier language of the act with the 
notable exception that coverage was limited to actions brought 
by the SEC or by the United States (the latter presumably 
being criminal cases).67   
In all of these proposals, the legislative language was 
worded in terms of the federal courts’ subject matter 
jurisdiction.68 The focus on jurisdiction is surprising because 
briefs in the Morrison case were already approaching this issue 
on the merits of Section 10(b).69 Nonetheless, Congress, as well 
 
that the extraterritorial reach of Section 10(b) was not a question of 
jurisdiction. See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6. 
 61. See Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Respondents at 
30–31 (citing H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2010)). The brief speculated several 
alternatives in which Congress may limit jurisdictions in deference to SEC.  
 62. See id. at 31. 
 63. Id. at 30. 
 64. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2006).  
 65. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2006).  
 66. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14 (2006).  
 67. Compare H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 7216 (2009), with H.R. 4173, 111th 
Cong. § 929P (2010). The earlier bill did not specify who can bring the action. 
The later bill only allows the courts to have jurisdiction over an action or 
proceeding brought by or instituted by the Commission or the United States.  
 68. See H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 7216. “The district courts of the United 
States and the United States courts of any Territory shall have jurisdiction of 
an action or proceeding . . . .”  
 69. See generally Supplemental Brief for Respondents at 2-5 Morrison v. 
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as the Second Circuit, approached the issue in Morrison as one 
of subject matter jurisdiction. 
Meanwhile, before Morrison was decided, the Supreme 
Court ruled on Union Pacific R. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers in 
late 2009.70 In Union Pacific, the Supreme Court held that 
Congress alone controls the jurisdictional reach of a statute, 
that jurisdiction is distinct from issues pertaining to the merits 
of a case, and that courts may not refuse to exercise jurisdiction 
based on their belief that no claim exists on the merits.71 The 
Court’s holding should not have been a surprise because the 
Court’s opinion in Union Pacific relied heavily on the Court’s 
prior holdings and other cases in which the same term was 
applied in a similar rule.72 
Under the reasoning of Union Pacific, the scope of Section 
10(b) is a question of merit, not a question of subject matter 
jurisdiction. Therefore, the federal courts have jurisdiction over 
cases brought under Section 10(b) including f-cubed cases. The 
question should be whether there is a cause of action under 
Section 10(b). The petitioners in Morrison, apparently realizing 
that they were very likely to lose the case and having second 
thoughts about taking it to the Supreme Court, mentioned 
asking the Court to remand the case to the Second Circuit for 
reconsideration as an issue of merit rather than an issue of 
jurisdiction in view of Union Pacific.73 The Supreme Court 
denied this motion and made a ruling based on the merit of the 
same issue that the parties had characterized as jurisdictional 
in the Second Circuit and in the cert petition.74 
 
NAB, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (discussing and citing cases). This concept was 
not new and goes back to Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006), Steel 
Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998), Romero v. International 
Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959), and  Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 
(1946). 
 70. Union Pacific R. Co., 130 S. Ct. 584 (2009).  
 71. Id. at 590, 596–99. 
 72. Id. at 596–97 (citing Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006); 
Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (2004));  see also United States v. Denedo, 129 
S. Ct. 2213 (2009) (holding that absent constitutional constraints, Congress 
decides what cases the federal courts have jurisdiction to consider, and that it 
is erroneous to conflate jurisdiction with the merits); United Student Aid 
Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 1367 (2010) (holding that bankruptcy 
court's discharge of student loan without making finding of hardship, although 
erroneous, was not beyond court's jurisdiction); Arthur Andersen LLP v. 
Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896 (2009) (holding that courts declined jurisdictions 
erred in "conflating the jurisdictional question with the merits"). 
 73. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877. 
 74. Id.  
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The Second Circuit in Morrison thus had erroneously 
considered the extraterritorial reach of Section 10(b) to raise a 
question of subject matter jurisdiction, affirming the District 
Court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(1).75 In view of Union Pacific, the case should have been 
decided on the merits under Rule 12(b)(6). As Justice Scalia 
observed in Morrison:  
[T]o ask what conduct §10(b) reaches is to ask what conduct §10(b) 
prohibits, which is a merits question. Subject-matter jurisdiction, by 
contrast, “refers to a tribunal’s ‘“power to hear a case.’” Union Pacific 
R. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen Gen. Comm. of 
Adjustment, Central Region, 558 U. S. ___, ___ (2009) (slip op., at 12) 
(quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 514 (2006), in turn 
quoting United States v. Cotton, 535 U. S. 625, 630 (2002)). It 
presents an issue quite separate from the question whether the 
allegations the plaintiff makes entitle him to relief.  See Bell v. Hood, 
327 U. S. 678, 682 (1946). The District Court here had jurisdiction 
under 15 U. S. C. §78aa to adjudicate the question whether §10(b) 
applies to National’s conduct.76 
The plaintiffs had asked for a remand to the Second Circuit 
in view of this error, but the Supreme Court refused and 
decided the case on the merits.77 Justice Scalia’s opinion went 
on to hold that, even though the federal courts had subject 
matter jurisdiction, there was no cause of action on the merits 
where the securities were not purchased in the United States.78 
The complaint was to be dismissed on the merits under Rule 
12(b)(6).79 
The difficulty is that nobody changed the language in the 
extraterritoriality provisions pending in Congress. The 
language was not changed even though the House passed the 
original bill in December 2009, a month and a half after the 
SEC and the Solicitor General told the Court this wasn’t a 
question of jurisdiction.80 The proposed legislative language 
 
 75. See Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 177 (2d 
Cir. 2008). 
 76.  Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877.   
 77.  See id. In denying Morrison’s request for a remand, the Court stated 
that because “nothing in the analysis of the courts below turned on the 
mistake, a remand would only require a new Rule 12(b)(6) label for the same 
Rule 12(b)(1) conclusion.”  Id.   
 78. Id. at 2888.  
 79. Id. at 2877.  
 80. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Morrison v. National Australia 
Bank, Ltd. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (No. 08-1191) at 16 (arguing that in an enforcement 
action brought by the Commission, the “transnational character of the 
fraudulent scheme is relevant only to the question whether defendants’ 
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continued to approach the question of extraterritoriality as one 
of subject matter jurisdiction rather than the merits under 
Section 10(b). The language ultimately adopted in Dodd-Frank 
in Section 929P of the Act is under the heading 
“Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the Antifraud Provisions of the 
Federal Securities Laws,” and reads: 
Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 
U.S.C. 78aa) is amended— 
. . . . . 
by adding at the end the following new subsection: 
‘‘(b) EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.—The district 
courts of the United States and the United States courts of any 
Territory shall have jurisdiction of an action or proceeding 
brought or instituted by the Commission or the United States 
alleging a violation of the antifraud provisions of this title 
involving— 
‘‘(1) conduct within the United States that constitutes 
significant steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the 
securities transaction occurs outside the United States and 
involves only foreign investors; or 
‘‘(2) conduct occurring outside the United States that has a 
foreseeable substantial effect within the United States.’’81 
The Dodd-Frank Act contains similar provisions with 
respect to Section 17A of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 
214 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940. 82   
 
conduct violated Section 10(b).”) The court already has jurisdiction under the 
“plain terms” of the statutory provisions that govern SEC enforcement suits. 
Id. Thus, Congress already decided that jurisdiction was proper, so the courts 
need not to.          
 81. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 929P(b)(2).   
 82. Id. § 929P(b)(1) & (3). Section 929Y of the Dodd-Frank Act also 
provides that the SEC shall solicit public comment and then conduct a study 
to determine the extent to which private rights of action under the antifraud 
provisions of the Exchange Act should be extended to cover the same conduct 
with respect to which actions brought by the SEC and the United States are 
authorized under Section 929P of the Act. The study: 
 
shall consider and analyze, among other things— 
(1) the scope of such a private right of action, including whether it should 
extend to all private actors or whether it should be more limited to extend just 
to institutional investors or otherwise; 
(2) what implications such a private right of action would have on 
international comity; 
(3) the economic costs and benefits of extending a private right of action for 
transnational securities frauds; and 
(4) whether a narrower extraterritorial standard should be adopted. Id. § 
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Some lawyers defending against SEC suits under these 
provisions may argue that they do not affect the Court’s 
holdings in Morrison as to what transactions fall within Section 
10(b) because these provisions merely give federal courts 
jurisdiction that the Morrison opinion recognized courts 
already have. Because the Dodd-Frank Act language does not 
speak to the merits, e.g. the substantive reach of Section 10(b), 
Congress has not changed the Court’s holding with respect to 
actions brought by the SEC or the United States. The Dodd-
Frank Act’s extraterritoriality provision thus does absolutely 
nothing other than affirm the opinion in Union Pacific, 
reiterated in Morrison, that this is not a question of subject 
matter jurisdiction because the courts have jurisdiction. 
Such a literal reading of the Dodd-Frank Act clearly does 
not reflect the intent of Congress. The problem is that the SEC 
still might not fare well before some lower court judges who do 
not care about the intent of Congress when Congress fails to 
clearly express that intent. If the Dodd-Frank Act does not 
explicitly address the merits of an SEC claim under Section 
10(b), and only speaks to jurisdiction, some courts may not be 
willing to read into the provision what Congress clearly 
intended: to empower the SEC to bring cases where the conduct 
was that described in the statute.   
Lower courts, particularly most courts of appeals, probably 
would not be willing to deviate from the plain language of the 
Act without a credible alternative explanation for what 
Congress intended to do in these provisions other than 
empower the SEC and DOJ to bring such suits. Most judges 
will not be willing to tell Congress that, because of the way a 
statute is worded, it fails to accomplish anything at all. On the 
other hand, Congress enacts statutes; it does not enact “intent.” 
In this instance, reconstructing what Congress intended 
involves construing every single enforceable substantive 
provision of three complex statutes as having been amended to 
 
929Y(b)(1) — (4).  
 
The provision requires that a report of the study be submitted and 
recommendations made to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the House 
within 18 months. Id. § 929Y(c). For a number of reasons expressed in the 
professors’ amicus brief in Morrison, such a private right of action is very 
worrisome from a policy perspective. See Law Professors' Am. Br. at 28–29. We 
do not address that issue here. 
 
PAINTER Formatted - CDL 11/29/2010  9:27 AM 
20 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW [Vol 20:1 
 
incorporate the conduct and effects tests used in the courts of 
appeals prior to Morrison if an action is brought by the SEC or 
DOJ. Some judges may say that amending the substantive 
provisions of these statutes is Congress’s job, not theirs. 
Congress merely telling the courts what they already knew, 
that the courts have jurisdiction, is not enough. The Supreme 
Court in particular has frequently sent Congress back to the 
legislative drawing board and might do so here.   
This article does not attempt to predict what will happen if 
Congress does not change the statute before the issue reaches 
the Supreme Court. In the meantime, however, the line of 
defense articulated by Conway has merit and could pose a 
preliminary obstacle to the SEC in some of the enforcement 
actions it brings under these provisions of the Dodd-Frank 
Act.83  
Despite Conway’s argument that the statute does not, in 
fact, have extraterritorial applications due to an apparent 
drafting error, the SEC has several arguments in its favor. 
First, as pointed out above, is the seemingly obvious intent of 
Congress. There is no alternative explanation for what 
Congress intended to do in these provisions of the Dodd-Frank 
Act. Congress wanted the SEC and DOJ to be able to bring 
suits in certain circumstances and described those 
circumstances in Dodd-Frank. Congress could not possibly have 
intended only to give federal courts jurisdiction over SEC and 
DOJ cases simply for the purpose of dismissing those cases on 
the merits. Congress intended to change the law (or at least 
change judicial interpretation of prior law).84 
 
 83. See Conway, supra note 10, at 1 (arguing that Section 929P(b) does 
“not expand the geographic scope of any substantive regulatory provision,” as 
the provision purports to do. Rather, the provision only addresses the 
“jurisdiction” of the district courts “to hear cases involving extraterritorial 
elements.”).   
 84. Even if the statutory language in Dodd-Frank only expressly grants 
courts jurisdiction they already have, there remains the question of whether 
courts should interpret Section 10(b) differently in view of this new statute. 
The SEC could successfully argue that because of the Dodd-Frank provisions 
the holding in Morrison has to be modified for DOJ and SEC actions. The 
Supreme Court applied the extraterritoriality presumption in Morrison 
because the Court saw no indicia whatsoever that Congress intended Section 
10(b) to apply to transactions outside the United States. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 
at 2883 ("In short, there is no affirmative indication in the Exchange Act that 
10(b) applies extraterritorially, and we therefore conclude that it does not."). 
But when Congress added the extraterritorial text in the jurisdiction provision 
in Dodd-Frank, Congress gave affirmative indication in the Exchange Act that 
the antifraud provisions of the Act apply extraterritorially. Congress thus 
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Second, there is a reason for the confusion on this issue 
because, up until Union Pacific in late 2009, courts of appeals 
had—however incorrectly—approached these questions as 
grounded in subject matter jurisdiction.85 Congress used the 
framework that most courts had used for a long time to address 
this issue—the extraterritorial application of Section 10(b).86 
Congress adopted this framework despite the Supreme Court’s 
finding in Union Pacific that the courts of appeals incorrectly 
applied subject-matter jurisdiction analysis. Thus, Congress’s 
final language might reflect a difficult point of law, on which 
the courts have reached contrary conclusions. Congress adopted 
this framework despite the Supreme Court’s finding in Union 
Pacific that the courts of appeals incorrectly applied subject-
matter jurisdiction analysis.  Thus, Congress’s final language 
might reflect a difficult point of law, on which the courts have 
reached contrary conclusions. 
Indeed, Congress has the final say on what is a question of 
subject matter jurisdiction. Under Arbaugh v. Y.H. Corp.,87 
Congress can make any issue one of subject matter jurisdiction 
by affirmatively including the issue in the statutory subject 
matter jurisdiction provisions.88 Congress thus can legislatively 
reverse the presumption articulated in Union Pacific for a 
 
implicitly modified the judicial construction of Section 10(b) as to DOJ and 
SEC enforcement actions when it affirmatively introduced statutory indicia of 
extraterritoriality. See United States  v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453 (1988) 
(statutory construction canon against repeal by implication does not apply as 
strongly where the "repeal" simply involves a judicial construction of a 
statute). This approach involves using a 2010 statute to shape judicial 
construction of a statute enacted in 1934, an exercise that some courts may 
not be willing to undertake. Nonetheless, some courts may hold that the Dodd-
Frank provisions for SEC and DOJ actions implicitly repeal Morrison’s judicial 
interpretation of 10(b) as incorporating a "transaction test." 
 85. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877 (recognizing that although the District 
Court incorrectly considered the extraterritorial reach of § 10(b) to raise a 
question of subject-matter jurisdiction, this decision was grounded in “Circuit 
precedent.”) (citing Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 208.) 
 86. See, e.g., Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 208; In re CP Ships Ltd. Sec. Litig., 
578 F.3d at 1313; Continental Grain, 592 F.2d at 421.  
 87. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 500. 
 88. See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 516 (noting that Congress has broad 
authority to “restrict the subject-matter jurisdiction of federal district courts 
based on a wide variety of factors, some of them also relevant to the merits of 
a case.”). For example, Congress exercised this power to make an amount-in-
controversy threshold an ingredient of subject-matter jurisdiction in 
delineating diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Id. at 
515. 
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particular statute and make the issue one of subject matter 
jurisdiction. Congress can also bestow jurisdiction when it 
wants to. The Dodd-Frank language apparently was intended 
by the SEC, when it was initially drafted, to codify the courts of 
appeals approach to extraterritoriality. The statutory language 
thus arguably works because it does two things: it turns the 
extraterritorial issue into a question of jurisdiction rather than 
the merits, and says that SEC and DOJ suits can proceed if 
brought in certain circumstances because there is jurisdiction.89   
Under this line of reasoning, the Dodd-Frank provisions 
thus reinstate the securities case law that had existed in courts 
of appeals—most notably the Third, Eighth, and Ninth 
Circuits90—before both Union Pacific and Morrison were 
decided. Union Pacific was not a securities case, but its broad 
language as pointed out in Morrison emphasizes that questions 
of statutory interpretation pertain to the merits, not to 
jurisdiction, unless Congress says otherwise. Now Congress is 
saying otherwise. The Dodd-Frank language thus seeks to 
restore decades of judicial precedent (none of this precedent 
was from the Supreme Court, however, and as pointed out 
above was contrary to the Court’s approach to jurisdiction even 
prior to Union Pacific).91 This precedent in the courts of appeals 
 
 89. In preparing this article, we spoke with the attorneys in the SEC 
Office of the General Counsel who, along with the Solicitor General's Office, 
drafted the Government's Morrison amicus briefs (both at the certiorari and 
merits stage). They explained to us that throughout the legislative process 
they were substantially involved in providing technical assistance to members 
of Congress that included, among other things, explaining the provisions' 
intended effect of codifying the courts of appeals' approach to 
extraterritoriality with respect to SEC and DOJ enforcement actions. 
 90. See, e.g., SEC v. Kaiser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1977); Continental 
Grain, 592 F.2d at 421; Butte Mining PLC v. Smith, 76 F.3d 287, 290–91 (9th 
Cir. 1996).     
 91. The federal courts over the years have been less than clear in 
explaining that extraterritoriality is not a question of subject matter 
jurisdiction. For example, in Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 511–13, the Supreme Court 
pointed to one of its own decisions, E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 
U.S. 244 (1991), in which it had characterized the extraterritorial effect of 
Title VII as jurisdictional, as an example of a decision in which it had been 
"less than meticulous" in distinguishing between subject matter jurisdiction 
and an ingredient of a claim for relief. See, e.g., Litecubes, LLC v. Northern 
Light Prods., Inc., 523 F.3d 1353, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("There is no indication 
that Congress intended the extraterritorial limitations on the scope of the 
Copyright Act to limit the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts."). 
Given the confusion created by the courts themselves, it could be seen as 
disrespectful of a coordinate branch of government for the courts—the district 
courts and courts of appeals in particular—to hold Congress to a higher 
standard of precision in its own drafting on the same issue when the intent of 
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held that extraterritoriality was a jurisdictional question and 
that certain suits could proceed because there was jurisdiction. 
Now, the SEC, in proposing the Dodd-Frank language,92 is 
asking Congress to put this issue in the jurisdictional box 
where the courts of appeals had placed it, and to confer 
jurisdiction. Admittedly, nowhere in the legislative history is 
there a statement that the SEC or Congress wanted this to be a 
jurisdictional issue instead of an issue of the merits in SEC and 
DOJ suits. The SEC, however, has favored the way 
extraterritoriality was analyzed in the courts of appeals.93 Even 
if, in the Morrison briefs, the SEC recognized that under 
Supreme Court precedent extraterritoriality was not a question 
of subject matter jurisdiction, the SEC still apparently wanted 
Congress to reinstate the approach of the courts of appeals in 
SEC and DOJ suits and drafted language that it believed did 
precisely that. Treating extraterritoriality as a jurisdictional 
question was part of this approach.  Whether or not the Dodd-
Frank language in fact works in this way (which would 
legislatively overrule Part II of the Morrison opinion along with 
the rest of that opinion) in SEC and DOJ suits, it was 
apparently intended to do so when it was drafted and sent to 
Congress by the SEC. 
Third, the Supreme Court in Morrison attached relatively 
little importance to the difference between jurisdictional 
questions and questions on the merits when it decided the 
question on the merits, even though the question had been 
presented to the Court as one of jurisdiction.  The Court did 
this even though the Petitioners asked the Court not to decide 
the case, but instead to remand to the Second Circuit in light of 
Union Pacific.94 Part II of the Morrison opinion points out that 
the two questions are not the same,95 but for purposes of this 
 
Congress to allow certain SEC and DOJ actions is clear.  
 92. It is clear from the briefs in Morrison that the SEC as well as the 
parties to the case recognized that the Court saw the issue before it as being 
one of the merits, not jurisdiction. See Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 
Ltd., Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
2010 WL 719337, at *6 (Feb. 26, 2010).   
 93. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869, at 6 
(No. 08-1191) (arguing that the “Courts of Appeals have consistently and 
correctly held that section 10(b) reaches at least some transnational 
fraudulent schemes that cause injury outside the United States.”).     
 94. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877.  
 95. See id. (stating that to ask what conduct § 10(b) reaches is to ask what 
conduct § 10(b) prohibits, which is a merits question. Subject-matter 
jurisdiction, by contrast, “refers to a tribunal’s power to hear a case.”).     
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case, it seemingly did not make much difference. The Court 
went ahead and decided the case anyway. Would the same 
Court later turn around and say that the same distinction—
between jurisdiction and the merits—is so important that 
Congress only addressed jurisdiction when it actually meant to 
address the merits?  
Finally, even if the SEC were to lose a case it brought 
under Section 10(b) because a court found the Dodd-Frank 
language insufficient to change the substantive reach of the 
statute, the SEC could argue that because the language in 
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act is broader, and because 
Section 17(a) has not yet been interpreted by the Supreme 
Court to preclude extraterritorial reach, courts should not now 
interpret Section 17(a) to preclude extraterritorial reach. In 
particular, the SEC could argue that the Dodd-Frank Act 
reveals Congress’s intent with respect to the reach of Section 
17(a) of the Securities Act, and that the courts should not 
subsequently interpret the statute in a manner contrary to that 
intent when they have not done so before. This argument might 
hold some sway, although the SEC would have to contend with 
the fact that the Morrison opinion is full of references to the 
Securities Act as well as the Exchange Act, and it is clear under 
Morrison that the presumption against extraterritoriality 
applies to both statutes.96 Admittedly this is dicta insofar as it 
applies to Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, but very strong 
dicta expressed by the Court before enactment of the Dodd-
Frank provisions on SEC and DOJ actions under Section 
17(a).97 
Admittedly, none of these arguments fully addresses the 
problem pointed out by Conway, that the Dodd-Frank provision 
nowhere addresses the substantive reach of the securities 
statutes.98 The provisions merely speak of jurisdiction after the 
Supreme Court had expressly said there was jurisdiction, that 
jurisdiction was not the issue, and that there was no case on 
the merits. The legislative language was not changed after 
Union Pacific. Union Pacific, furthermore, was not a significant 
change to the Supreme Court’s earlier approach to jurisdiction. 
The Dodd-Frank language passed through the House at a time 
when the drafters knew there was jurisdiction and that the 
question before the Court in Morrison was the merits. The 
 
 96. See id. at 2877, 2885. 
 97. See id. 
 98.  See Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen, & Katz, supra note 10.   
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statute still does not directly address the merits. Collectively, 
the above arguments tilt the scales in favor of the SEC, but the 
situation Congress has left for the SEC and the courts is not a 
good one.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
In sum, it is doubtful that many courts will flout the will of 
Congress and decide against the SEC on this issue, particularly 
in view of the circumstances in which Congress enacted these 
provisions. Although the statutory language had been drafted 
in anticipation of the Court’s holding in Morrison, it was not 
known that it would go in the statute until Morrison was 
actually decided. The final full day of the Dodd-Frank House-
Senate conference was the day the Supreme Court decided 
Morrison, giving the conferees limited time to react. It was 
later that morning that the Senate side of the conference 
committee adopted the SEC/DOJ provisions, and that evening 
that Congressman Kanjorski proposed the private study of 
private rights of actions.99 Under these circumstances, 
Congress’s intent to override Morrison in SEC and DOJ actions 
(even if less than artfully worded) is clear and is likely to carry 
substantial weight. 
This is, however, legislative language that Congress did 
not change or explain despite months of notice that 
extraterritoriality was seen by the Supreme Court as a 
question of the merits rather than jurisdiction. Congress should 
do the right thing and enact a legislative fix before the 
government and private parties are burdened by litigation on 
this issue. Congress should make the statutory language in the 
Dodd-Frank Act say what it meant to say.  
 
 
 
 99. See H.R. Res. 3817, 111th Cong. (2009).   
